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NOTES
A. Possession But Not Title

Because all of the transactions to be discussed are covered by
statutes which vary in many states, there is no general American rule.
This comment will cover primarily personal property in Nebraska
under the Nebraska statutes.
Statutes which void transactions where the debtor has possession
of the property but not the title have been based on theory of apparent
ownership.3 This theory applies to existing creditors because they may
-delay in pressing their claims by not knowing the true nature of the
transaction, and thus be harmed; and to subsequent creditors because
they may rely upon the apparent ownership of the property in the
debtor, and thus become creditors when they would not have done so
if they had known the debtor did not have title. However, it is impossible to generalize and give a single definition of "creditors" when
considering the problem of the debtor having possession but not title.
Although the legislature has attempted to define what creditors fall
within the meaning of each statute, the courts have often changed the
meaning for policy reasons.
Sales
Section 36-2044 makes all sales without change of possession and immediate delivery of the property presumptively fraudulent as to
creditors of the vendor. 36-2055 defines creditors as used in 36-204
as all persons who shall be creditors of the vendor at any time while
the goods remain in his possession.
It has been held that it is immaterial whether the person becomes a
creditor before or after the sale, so long as the vendor is still in
possession.6 In giving this interpretation to the statute, the Nebraska
Court recognized that statutes merely give effect to the common law
and the interpretation given by the majority of the other states. Even
though the basis for protecting creditors is the statute of 13 Eliz, c. 5
(1570), the court argues that the common law would have reached the
same result eventually for the object of the common law in such cases
7
is to protect both antecedent and subsequent creditors.
However, the Nebraska Supreme Court has define6. creditors as
creditors who have acquired a lien, either by levy of an attachment or
execution on a judgment before delivery of possession to the vendee.8
1 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences § 348 (Rev. ed. 1940).

'Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1952).
Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1952).
Densmore v. Tomer, 14 Neb. 392, 15 N.W. 734 (1882).

'Id; at 395, 15 N.W. at 735.
Neely v. Trautwein, 79 Neb. 751, 113 N.W. 141 (1907); Dexter v. Citizens'

Nat. Bank, 4 Neb. (unof.) 380, 94 N.W. 530 (1903); Snyder v. Dangler, 44 Neb.
600, 63 N.W. 20 (1895); Wake v. Griffin, 9 Neb. 47, 2 N.W. 461 (1879); Robinson
v. Uhl, 6 Neb. 328 (1877).
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This allows the presumption of fraud to be raised only by a diligent
creditor who is actively seeking satisfaction of his claim by obtaining
a levy of execution or attachment upon the property. Authorities reason that this is a just result because "... the relation of debtor and creditor expresses nothing but the right to use the courts; for the creditor to
sue to judgment; the debtor, to defend on merits. The creditor, as such,
has no interest in his debtor's property that any court of law will
recognize."9
While in a sense this is circular reasoning, it also expresses a fundamental concept that the creditor achieves no interest in his debtor's
property until he exercises some right by operation of law. Also it appears that between an inactive creditor and a negligent buyer, the
equities are not as disproportionate as between a diligent creditor and
a negligent buyer. This disparity of equities gives the court a valid
justification for protecting only creditors who have secured a .levy by
attachment or judgment.
Good faith on the part of the creditor is not a requirement, but in
view of the policy behind the statute, there appears to be no reason
to protect a creditor who has knowledge of a conveyance and does not
actively seek to protect his interest in the debtor's property. Since the
conveyance is presumptively fraudulent, and the final determination
of the effect of the transaction is a fact question, a creditor's knowledge of the nature of the transaction would certainly be a consideration in determining the validity of the creditor's claim.
Chattel Mortgages

36-20410 makes every mortgage without change of possession and
immediate delivery of the goods presumptively fraudulent as to creditors of the mortgagor. 36-30111 makes a chattel mortgage absolutely
fraudulent unless it is recorded.
Since 36-204 applies to chattel mortgages as well as sales, the definition of creditors in 36-205 should apply to chattel mortgages also. Just
as in a sales transaction, the creditor must have acquired a lien or
charge on the property by levy or other judicial process. 12 The crediIGlenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences § 9, § 349 (Rev. ed.
§ 350 to § 353, § 380 (Rev. ed. 1948).
1940);
10 See also Williston, Sales
Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1952).
"Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1952).
12"Forrester v. Kearney Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 655, 68 N.W. 1059 (1896). Also,
Oleson v. Pumphrey, 125 Neb. 708, 251 N.W. 828 (1933); Folsom v. Peru Plow
& Impl. Co., 69 Neb. 316, 95 N.W. 635 (1903) (specific lien); Meyer v. Miller,
51 Neb. 620, 71 N.W. 315 (1897); Spaulding v. Johnson, 48 Neb. 830, 67 N.W. 874
(1896); Farmers & Merchants Bank of York v. Anthony, 39 Neb. 343, 57 N.W.
1029 (1894); Sherwin v. Gaghagen, 39 Neb. 238, 57 N.W. 1005 (1894); Kay v.
Noll, 20 Neb. 380, 30 N.W. 269 (1886); Fitzgerald v. Andrews, 15 Neb. 52, 17
N.W. 370 (1883); see Burke v. Frederickson, 131 Neb. 548, 268 N.W. 348 (1936).
Although dicta indicates that a judgment is sufficient, in Reiss v. Argubright,
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tor's lien must be acquired either before transfer of possession from the
13
mortgagor to the mortgagee or before the filing of the mortgage.
Even if the mortgage is recorded, it is still prima facie fraudulent as
to creditors of the mortgagor if there is no immediate change of possession. The presumption, however, may be overcome by evidence of
good faith. 4 The rationale is that filing is not the equivalent to change
of possession and that there is no statutory duty to file immediately.
Thus under 36-204 a creditor is not without remedy though a chattel
mortgage is registered, and the burden of proving that the mortage is
not fraudulent is upon the chattel mortgagee. 1 5
The effect upon the rights of creditors of a delay in filing the chattel
mortgage has raised some conflicts in the law. One problem is what
creditors gain rights by a delay in filing a chattel mortgage. The most
liberal view is the Karst v. Gane 16 doctrine. This view argues that
an unnecessary delay in filing a chattel mortgage and obtaining possession of the property by the mortgagee renders the mortgage void,
not only to creditors of the mortgagor who became such after the giving
of the mortgage, but also, as to those whose debts were contracted before that time, despite the fact they did not reduce their claims to
judgments, and seize the mortgaged chattels until after the mortgage
was placed upon record or possession of the property was obtained by
the mortgagee.
Another view is that the chattel mortgage is void as to creditors of
the mortgagor who became such after the execution of the mortgage,
and before its filing or the taking of possession of the property by the
mortgagee, and to such preexisting creditors who have prejudiced
7
their rights because of the non-existence of the mortgage.'
The Nebraska Court declined to follow either of these views when
it interpreted the chattel mortgage statute. Instad the court held,
except in cases where there was other evidence of intent to defraud,
that the mortgage was not void because of mere delay in filing. The
court stated that the legislature intended recording to protect only
judgment creditors. Therefore, other creditors receive no protection

3 Neb. (unof.) 756, 92 N.W. 988 (1902) and First Nat. Bank v. Young, 124 Neb.
598, 247 N.W. 586 (1933), the Court relied upon Farmers & Merchants Bank of
York v. Anthony, supra, which required a levy and is explained in Forrester v.

Kearney Nat. Bank, supra. at 663.

" Forrester v. Kearney Nat. Bank, supra note 12; Farmer &:Merchant Nat.
Bank v. Anthony, supra note 12; Spaulding v. Johnson, supra note 12; Fitzgerald v. Andrews, supra note 12.
" Marsh v. Burley, 13 Neb. 261, 13 N.W. 279 (1882); see Pyle v. Warren, 2
Neb.1 241, 252 (1873).
Sherwin v. Gaghagen, 39 Neb. 238, 57 N.W. 1005 (1894).
16 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073 (1893).
" Union Nat'l. Bank v. Oium, 54 N.W. 1034 (N.D. 1892); Root v. Hari, 62
Mich. 420, 29 N.W. 29 (1886).
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under the statute.'8 This also reflects the reluctance of the court in
these early decisions to do anything to aid creditors who were not
active in seeking satisfaction of their claims against the debtor.' 9
This theory is further supported by the Nebraska Court's holding
that if there was an agreement between the mortgagor and the mortgagee not to file, then the mortgage is void only to the extent the creditors have been damaged by the agreement.20 The basis for this is that
the only action available to the creditor is for fraud. Fraud is a tort,
and in order to recover for a tort, one must prove damage. 21 Thus while
there are few equities with a mortgagee who agrees not to record, the
Nebraska Court is reluctant to aid creditors who have not been diligent.
Good faith on the part of the creditor is not a factor under the recording act (36-301). Thus if a chattel mortgage is not filed, the creditor
obtaining a levy by attachment or judgment having knowledge of the
existence of the unrecorded chattel mortgage, 22 or the purchaser at an
execution sale with similar notice, 23 prevails over the chattel mortgagee. The reasoning of these holdings is that the mortgage is invalid
per se as to creditors, and thus the creditor's knowledge is not a factor.2 4
But if the creditor with the notice of the unrecorded mortgage becomes
a purchaser of the property in settlement of the debt instead of obtaining a lien by levy of attachment or execution prior to the filing of .the
chattel mortgage, then the creditor takes subject to the mortgage. The
Court reasoned that the creditor is entitled to special protection and
may assault the mortgage "with the weapons of the law." "But when he
descended into the arena to barter, and sought to become a purchaser,
then it was necessary that he be clothed with good faith ... (and not
know of the existence of the chattel mortgage), 2 5 Therefore it is
extremely dangerous for a creditor to take a chattel without obtaining
a lien by judicial process when he knows of the unrecorded chattel
mortgage, for he will then be impairing his position in relation to other
creditors and the unrecorded chattel mortgagee.
"Forrester v. Kearney Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 655, 68 N.W. 1059 (1896).
1 Id. at 662, 68 N.W. at 1061.
Mattley v. Wolfe, 175 Fed. 619 (D.C. Neb. 1909); First Nat. Bank v. Tolerton & Stetson, 5 Neb. (unoff.) 43, 97 N.W. 248 (1903); Carpenter Paper v. News
Pub. Co., 63 Neb. 59, 87 N.W. 1050 (1901); Ackerman v. Ackerman, 50 Neb. 54,

69 N.W. 388 (1896).

11 Carpenter Paper Co. v. News Pub. Co., supra note 20 at 63, 87 N.W. at 1051.
21Hillebrand v. Nelson, 1 Neb. (unof.) 783, 95 N.W. 1068 (1901) (Chattel
mortgage filed under real estate mortgages held not valid as to creditors.);
Farmers & Merchants Bank of York v. Anthony, 39 Neb. 343, 57 N.W. 1029
(1894).
3
v. Karmard, 2 Neb. (unof.) 157, 96 N.W. 118 (1901) (Purchaser
-1Johns
with notice of mortgage at execution sale prevails over the mortgagee.)
-Farmers & Merchants Bank of York v. Anthony, 39 Neb. 343, 349, 57 N.W.
1029,
21 1030 (1894).

Earle v. Burch, 21 Neb. 702, 709, 33 N.W. 254, 257 (1887).
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What other judicial processes are sufficient to establish a lien is a
question that has raised controversy. Creditors who belore filing of a
chattel mortgage force the debtor into bankruptcy, prevail over the
mortgagee through the trustee in bankruptcy. The Federal Bankruptcy Act gives the trustee all the rights, remedies, and powers of a
judgment creditor holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied.'
This was so held even before the express power was granted by
statute.2 7 However, the administrator of the estate of a deceased chattel mortgagor, even though the administrator holds the property for
the benefit of creditors, does not prevail over a chattel mortgagee who
recorded his lien subsequent to the appointment of the administrator.-"
The Court reasoned that a creditor has nothing until his claim has been
adjudicated and allowed.20 One might reply that an attachment creditor does not have an accepted claim that has been adjudicated and
allowed either, and yet the court has ruled that the attaching creditor
prevails over the unrecorded chattel mortgagee.30 The basis for this
distinction between the status of the trustee in bankruptcy and that
of the administrator of an estate in probate proceedings can be
rationalized, however, by other policy factors.
Conditional Sales
36-20731 provides that a conditional sale of personal property is not
valid as to any "judgment" creditor without notice, unless a copy is
recorded. It also states that the contract ceases to be valid at the expiration of five years from the date of the sale as to "attaching and
judgment" creditors without notice, unless recorded and kept valid by
an annual refiling.
The fact that the first part of the statute referred only to "judgment"
creditors and the latter part of the statute referred to "'judgment and
attaching" creditors prompted Professor Hanna to observe "the draftsmanship of the 1877 statute (36-207) will never be used as a model by
a legislative drafting bureau even if its meaning is not wholly incomprehensible ... 32 The Nebraska Court has held that the statute not

-164 Stat. 23 (1950); 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (as amended to March 1950), but

see 66 Stat. 430 (1952); Hanna, MacLachlan Bankruptcy Act § 70(c) (5th ed.
1953); see also Rankin v. Cox, 71 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1934) (application of the act

to a fraudulent conveyance.); In re Herkimer Mills, 39 F.2d 625 (N.D. N.Y.
1930) (chattel mortgage); Slosburg v. Hunter, 136 Neb. 327, 285 N.W. 563
(1939).
" In re Perkin Plow Co., 112 Fed. 308 (8th Cir. 1901).
-8Folsom v. Peru Plow Impl. Co., 69 Neb. 316, 95 N.W. 635 (1903).
_Id. at 319, 95 N.W. at 636.

See note 13 supra.
' Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1952).
Hanna, Nebraska Law on Conditional Sales, 10 Neb. L. Bull. 141, 154
'°
12

(1931).
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only protects judgment creditors, but attachment creditors as well,
basing its decision on legislative intent and the rule that the statute
should be read together. It refused to rest its decision on the theory
that the attaching creditor later became a judgment creditor retroactive to the date of attachment. 33 Here too, it is necessary that a lien
34
be acquired by levy of attachment or execution.
Williston says the general rule is that a creditor must have a lien
prior to filing.30 However, this rule has been criticized on the ground
that the only creditors who should be protected by the recording statute
are those who extended credit on the apparent ownership of the goods,
such creditors often have not perfected their lien prior to filing of the
conditional sale. Prior creditors with a lien need not prevail unless
one adopts the fiction that they delayed in enforcing their claims on
the basis of the apparent ownership of the new goods by the debtor.
It is true that the creditor who has obtained a lien by levy or attachment has been vigilant and active and should have a preference over
creditors who have no liens, but it is doubtful that he should have
priority over the conditional seller who has something more than a
lien, namely a reservation of title for the purposes of security. 6
The Nebraska Court has required that the creditor show injury from
37
the delay in the recording of the the conditional sales agreement It
has further held that general creditors do not have an interest in the
debtor's property and, therefore, are not in the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute.38 The result of the Nebraska holdings appears generally to give only those creditors who extend credit
subsequent to the conditional sale and who have obtained a lien by
levy of execution or attachment prior to recording of the agreement a
claim on the property. The burden upon an antecedent creditor of
proving damage by the unrecorded conditional sale to the debtor appears too great to give him much protection under the statute. The
Nebraska rule is more equitable than that allowing antecedent creditors to prevail, but works a hardship on subsequent general creditors.

2

Peterson v. Tufts, 34 Neb. 8, 51 N.W. 297 (1892).
,Wilson v. Lewis, 63 Neb. 617, 88 N.W. 690 (1902); see also, Johns & Sandy

v. Reed, 77 Neb. 492, 109 N.W. 738 (1906); Starr v. Dow, 77 Neb. 172, 108 N.W.
1065 (1906); Campbell Printing Press & MAfg. Co. v. Dyer, 46 Neb. 830, 65 N.W.

904 (1896).
1 Williston, Sales, § 327 (a) (Rev. ed. 1948).
15 2A Uniform Laws Ann., Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales § 58
(1924). The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, which has not been passed in Nebraska, takes the position in § 5 that the conditional sale shall be void to any
creditor who buys or obtains an attachment or levy of a lien upon the goods
if the contract is not filed within ten days after making the sale.
2 Wilson v. Lewis, 63 Neb. 617, 88 N.W. 690 (1902).
' Johns & Sandy v. Reed, 77 Neb. 492, 109 N.W. 738 (1906).
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Knowledge on the part of the creditor should defeat his right to avoid
the contract whether recorded or not.39
Motor Vehicles
60-11040 states that any mortgage, trust receipt, or conditional sales
contract covering a motor vehicle, if such instrument is accompanied
by a manufacturer's or importer's certificate and followed by actual
and continued possession of the same by the holder of said instrument
or notation made on the certificate of title by the county clerk, shall
be valid as against creditors of the mortgagor, whether armed with

process or not.
This system of registering liens on a certificate of title by the county
clerk is similar to the ill-fated Torrens system of land recording 4' but
a more workable plan for motor vehicles. While levy by attachment
or execution does not appear to be necessary, the Nebraska Court, in
holding that a chattel mortgage registered one day after the levy of
attachment was a subsequent lien to the sheriff's levy, placed emphasis
on the date of the levy:
The notation of the mortgage... was not made on the certificate of title
of the truck until one day after the levy of execution thereon. It was,
42
because of this fact, void as to creditors of the mortgagor.

Apparently the lien was acquired by an antecedent creditor whose
debt matured one month after the unrecorded mortgage was made,
but the court did not discuss this point. Because recordation on the
instrument is the important element of securing valid title, good faith
by a creditor in such a case is not important.
B. Transfer of Title and Possession
Fraudulent Conveyances
36-40143 provides that conveyances or assignments :f an estate or
interest in lands, or in goods or things in action made with intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors of their lawful right, debts, or demands as against the person to hindered, delayed, or defrauded, shall
be void.

44

" Note that even though Nebraska has not passed the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, that § 36-207 gives creditors nearly as much protection by statute as
§ 5 of the Conditional Sales Act.
"Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1952).
" The Torrens land recording system act was passed by the Nebraska legislature in 1915, but the system was not used by landowners and the act was
repealed in 1943.
" Alliance Loan & Inv. Co. v. Morgan, 154 Neb. 745, 747, 49 N.W.2d 593, 594
(1951).
" Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1952).
" It is not within the scope of this comment to discuss the types of con-

veyances and transfers which fall within this statute, nor the remedies of the
creditors who come within its protection.
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This section has been interpreted to include all creditors who are
harmed thereby, whether their claims are reduced to judgment or not,45
thus giving effect to the plain meaning of the statute. The theory upon
which the creditor prevails is of an equitable nature. The Nebraska
Court explained:
A debtor, while the owner of his property, sustains two relations in regard to it, viz., as owner and as quasi-trustee for his creditors. If his
creditors have taken no lien upon the property as security, they may be
said to have given him credit upon his implied agreement that his property shall, if necessary, be applied to the payment of his debts, and such
creditors have an equitable lien upon the property for that purpose.46
Thus an equitable lien then prevails over the holder of the legal title
and possession of these goods if they were conveyed fraudulently. Subsequent creditors may be protected if they can prove that the transfer
was made to defraud subsequent creditors whose debts were in contemplation at the time of the transfer, and that they were actually defrauded thereby.4 7 The burden is on the creditors to make the showing of fraud and a subsequent creditor faces a difficult battle in proving
fraud in these cases.
Since it is necessary that the creditor be harmed by the transfer,
one who is a secured creditor is not within the meaning of the statute;48
but if he is only partially secured creditor by an unsatisfied mortgage,
he is an existing creditor and will have standing to attack the transfer.49
A contingent creditor, such as a depositor with a claim against the
stockholder of a bank for the amount of his stock, can avoid the conveyance when the contingency occurs.50 The Court reasoned that when
the stockholder becomes the contingent debtor in an attempt to gain
profit, he should also bear the risk of loss and not be able to dispose
of his property fraudulently. There is dicta in the case broad enough
to indicate that even an accommodation indorser or an uncompensated surety comes within the scope of the act if the contingency
arises;5 1 however the express question has not yet been decided in Ne"In re Bicknell, 48 F.Supp. 895 (D.C. Neb. 1943), aff'd Epp v. Bicknell, 138
F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 766 (1944); Goodman-Buckley
Trust Co. v. Poulos, 124 Neb. 697, 248 N.W. 64 (1933); Beels v. Flynn, 28 Neb.
575, 44 N.W. 732 (1890); 3 Williston, Sales § 642 (Rev. ed. 1948).
"Beels v. Flynn, supra note 43 at 580, 44 N.W. at 733.
"Big

Horn Collieries Co. v. Roland, 116 Neb. 846, 219 N.W. 233 (1928);

Jayne v. Hymer, 66 Neb. 785, 92 N.W. 1019 (1902); Ayers v. Wolcott, 66 Neb.
712, 92 N.W. 1036 (1902); Racek v. First Nat. Bank of North Bend, 62 Neb. 669.
87 N.W. 542 (1901); Graham v. Estate of Townsend, 62 Neb. 364, 87 N.W. 169

(1901).
"In re Bicknell, supra note 41.
"Lincoln Savings & Loan v. Mann. 129 Neb. 26, 260 N.W. 559 (1935);
Christensen v. Smith, 123 Neb. 388, 243 N.W. 118 (1932).
" Luikart v. Detweiler, 133 Neb. 614, 276 N.W. 395 (1937); Peterson v. Wahlquist, 125 Neb. 247, 249 N.W. 678 (1933); see 89 A.L.R. 747 (1934).
11 Peterson v. Wahlquist, supra note 50 at 251, 249 N.W. at 680.
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braska. The claim may be unliquidated, as well as unmatured. Thus
an administrator became a creditor within the meaning of 36-401 from
the date of the debtor's tort resulting in the wrongful death of the
52
decedent.
Trusts
36-20153 provides that transfers of goods, chattels, or things in action
made in trust for the use of the person making the same shall be void
as against creditors, existing or subsequent, of such person.
There have been very few decisions defining the creditors within
the scope of conveyances made in trust. However, the Nebraska Court
has held that such a transfer is void as to all creditors, whether prior
or subsequent.
The facts-of the cases cited also indicate that general
creditors fall within the statute.
Bulk Sales Act

36-5015r provides that a sale of a stock of goods not in the ordinary
course of trade is void against creditors of the seller unless they are
notified as provided in the statute.
The buyer has a duty only to those general creditors to whom the
seller is indebted at the time of the transfer or to whom he may be
expected to owe money.56 It appears that this notice should be sufficient
to warn all interested in the debtor's property of the impending transfer. The debt may be unmatured, and need not arise in the course of
the business being sold; nor need the creditor be a creditor for the
specific goods being sold.5 It is immaterial that the creditor have
knowledge of the sale of the stock of goods through other means than
the notification provided for in the statute,5 s unless he does some act
which amounts to an estoppel.5 9
The creditor may also be barred by the Statute of Limitations. If
he made an unreasonable delay in taking steps to set aside the debtor's
conveyance as fraudulent, though the time was less than the Statute of
Limitations, and if the grantee relied upon the title to discharge
other liens on the property, the creditor will not prevail."
2
Evers v. Evers, 146 Neb. 104, 18 N.W.2d 673 (1945).
53Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1952).
Z, Racek v. First Nat. Bank of North Bend, 62 Neb. 669, 87 N.W. 542 (1901):
Graham v. Estate of Townsend, 62 Neb. 364, 87 N.W. 169 (1901).
Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1952).

50Damcus v. Kelly, 120 Neb. 588, 234 N.W. 416 (1931); Cech v. Costello, 117
Neb. 224, 220 N.W. 236 (1928); Fisher v. Woodward, 103 Neb. 253, 170 N.W. 907

(1919); Scheve v. Vanderkolk, 97 Neb. 214, 149 N.W. 401 (1914); 1 Glenn,
Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, § 315 (Rev. ed. 1940); 3 Williston,
Sales § 64(a) (Rev. ed. 1948).

1 Damcus v. Kelly, Cech v. Costello, supra note 53.
18Damcus v. Kelly, supra note 54.
0Fisher v. Woodward, 103 Neb. 253, 170 N.W. 907 (1919).

6o Blum v. Voss, 139 Neb. 234, 297 N.W. 84 (1941).
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Conclusion

Although this subject is covered entirely by legislative enactment,
a reading of the applicable statute will not adequately reveal who falls
within its scope since the court interpretations are so varied that it is
impossible to generalize from the policy behind the statute or to infer
the answer from holdings on other types of transactions. That confusion should persist in situations which are as old and common as those
discussed here seems completely without reasons. Since these are
primarily remedial statutes, the courts should give a more liberal interpretation and thus protect as many creditors as the statute will
permit. The following table illustrates the lack of uniformity in the
treatment of various creditors under Nebraska's statutes. An overhaul of the statutes by the legislature for the purpose of uniformity
and clarity seems to be the plausible solution for this difficult problem.
ROBERT

Transaction

Date
Enacted

Status of the
Creditor

H. BERKSHIRE, '55

Time of Becoming
A Creditor
I

Good Faith

SALES
§36-204

1866

Lien by levy or ju- While goods are in Immaterial
dicial process before possession of the
delivery of posses- vendor-debtor
sion

CHATTEL MORTGAGE
§36-204
§36-301

1866

Lien by levy or ju- While goods are in Immaterial
dicial process before possession of the
delivery of posses- mortgagor-debtor
sion or recording

CONDITIONAL
SALE
§36-207

1871

Prior creditors must Prior or during pos- Good faith requi-ed
have lien by levy session of goods
before change of
possession or recording. Existing
creditors may acquire their lien afterward.

MOTOR VEHICLES
§60-110

1939

Probably a lien by Probably immater- Probably immaterexecution.
ial
ial

FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES
§36-401

1866

General creditor if Existing at time of Immaterial
harmed
conveyance, or subsequent if debt was
contemplated

TRUSTS
§36-201

1866

General creditor

Exiting or subseInmateral
quent to transfer

BULK
§36-501SALES

1907

General creditor

Existing
not
saleoths at time of
to Immaterial
through the if statuwhom he is expect- tory procedure
ed to owe

